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Introduction 
The globalization surge of the past three decades mostly missed the poorest countries in the 
world.  While other developing countries were able to ride the wave, the share of today’s least 
developed countries (LDCs) in global exports fell by two-thirds from 1970 to 2000, twice as 
much as the fall in their share of global income.
1 In broad terms, there are two principal sources 
of the LDCs’ poor export performance: severe supply-side challenges, resulting from a lack of 
sound institutions and policies, inadequate infrastructure, and a paucity of physical and human 
capital; and implicit discrimination against their exports in rich-country trade policies. Progress 
is being made in a number of countries in addressing the supply-side challenges, but these 
problems will not be solved easily or quickly. The second source of poor export performance in 
poor countries should be more amenable to reform, as it requires only that richer countries 
open their markets to countries accounting for a tiny share of global trade.  
The high-income members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and increasingly advanced developing countries as well, provide preferential market 
access for developing countries, but even the more generous programs for LDCs often contain 
exceptions. Moreover, the exceptions are usually concentrated in a narrow range of products 
where LDCs have comparative advantage, especially agricultural commodities (often sugar, rice, 
meat, and dairy) and labor-intensive manufactures, such as textiles, apparel, and footwear. The 
effects of these politically-driven exclusions are further magnified by the structural weaknesses 
in the economies of LDCs, which are generally not very diversified. Thus, even a small number 
of product exclusions can rob preference programs of much of the potential benefit. In addition 
to the remaining formal barriers, preferential arrangements have rules of origin that restrict 
international sourcing of inputs and that is an acute concern in poorer countries with a high 
degree of specialization in the manufacturing sector, and limited ability to create the backward 
and forward linkages required by many origin regimes.
2  
To boost LDC engagement in global markets as a tool of poverty reduction, UN members agreed 
in the 2000 Millennium Declaration that developed countries should provide duty-free, quota-
free (DFQF) market access for LDCs. That Millennium Development Goal (MDG) was reaffirmed 
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005, except that U.S. 
                                                           
1 Data is for today’s list of LDCs (because the list changed over time) and is from the United Nations Comtrade 
database and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
2 In assessing the potential to expand poor-country exports, it is important to keep in mind that administrative and 
regulatory barriers also arise outside the preference programs themselves. Most notably for some LDCs in Africa, 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards to protect human, plant, and animal safety frequently block agricultural 
exports because many poor countries lack the capacity to certify compliance. negotiators insisted on limiting it to 97 percent of tariff lines. At the same time, the 
communiqué also called on developing countries “in a position to do so” to provide expanded 
preferential access for LDCs. 
This study assesses four broad questions around improved market access for poor countries: 
-  How much would LDCs gain from 100 percent versus 97 percent DFQF market access in 
OECD markets? 
-  How would the distribution of gains and losses change if eligibility for DFQF access were 
extended to additional small and poor countries? 
-  How much would LDC gains rise if Brazil, China, and India also provide full market 
access? 
-  What would be the effect of improved access on producers in preference-giving 
countries? 
To preview the results, the analysis confirms the result from previous research that 97 percent 
market access provides very few benefits for LDCs. But the evidence does not support two of 
the chief concerns about expanded preferential access for those countries. First, sub-Saharan 
Africa overall stands to gain, not lose, if OECD countries, including the United States, provide 
100 percent DFQF market access for all LDCs; and other developing countries, such as Pakistan, 
do not suffer from preference erosion. Second, preference-giving countries do not suffer 
market disruption from removing exclusions for sensitive products, such as sugar or dairy. The 
adjustments are greater, however, if DFQF market access is extended to a broader group of 
small and poor countries. 
Methodology 
The MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium) model is a 
multi-sector, dynamic, multi-region computable general equilibrium model devoted to trade 
policy analysis. It is described in detail and the implications of its features compared with other 
CGE models are analyzed in Bouët (2008) and the model is extensively described in Decreux and 
Valin (2007). Simulations are run until 2020 to measure the long-term impact of the policy 
scenarios. The model is applied using data on the economic structure and trade of 113 
countries in 57 sectors from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 7 
(Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008), and data on trade policies, including preferential tariff levels, 
from the MAcMapHS6 version 2 database (Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna, 2009).
3 
If these tools have been widely used in numerous global or regional trade agreement 
assessments, specific modifications have been done for this study. First, the tariff data set has 
been updated so that the baseline reflects important trade policy changes since MAcMapHS6 
was last updated in 2004 (see next section). Second, the trade matrix was adjusted to 
                                                           
3 The MAcMapHS6 database has the most detailed information available on market access barriers and 
preferential trading arrangements, including bound and applied tariffs under World Trade Organization rules, and 
preferential tariffs arising from reciprocal regional trade agreements or unilateral preference programs, such as 
those studied here. 3 
 
discriminate between "real" trade and virtual (or potential) trade. Our focus on LDCs requires 
particular care in the use of the data because of weaknesses and gaps in reporting by those 
countries and the problems are compounded in the case of potential exports that are blocked 
by prohibitive tariffs in importing countries. In the latter case, the trade matrix of the GTAP 
database allows for the possibility of trade creation by using constructed trade values instead of 
zeroes. For example, the trade matrix of the GTAP database includes "virtual" merchandise 
trade flows related to travel expenditures: rather than being treated as an export of services, 
the expenses of a Japanese tourist in Cambodia are translated in the database as a dutiable 
export of the consumed goods from Cambodia to Japan. But these “virtual” trade flows can be 
problematic in our assessment when it creates non-negligible exports from a LDC to an OECD 
country after removal of a high tariff on a specific commodity. For instance, the GTAP database 
displays an export of processed rice of about $100,000 by Senegal to Japan facing a 340 percent 
tariff. Based on the model parameters (Armington elasticities for imperfect substitutes), the 
elimination of the duty can lead to a 15-fold increase in Senegalese exports of rice to Japan. 
Unfortunately, this flow is purely artificial and there is no way of knowing whether trade 
liberalization would boost Senegalese exports or by how much. Due to the magnitude of the 
shock, this problem will lead to a significant bias in our results.  
To address the problems created by constructed trade values, we split the GTAP trade matrix in 
two categories: real trade flows, based on the trade data inputs to the GTAP database by Mark 
Gehlhar, and virtual ones.
4 Tariffs, and their elimination, will affect only the former category. In 
addition, we have checked the quality of the input-output tables for key products in the LDC 
countries we focus on to avoid important mistakes due to data quality problems. For instance, 
the GTAP7 database shows that 15 percent of the production cost of processed rice in Senegal 
is due to imported wheat and 0 percent to the local paddy rice. This mistake in the construction 
of the IO table will also lead to serious problems in the CGE assessment since it implies that 
Senegal can export rice without producing it and simply by importing wheat. We fix such issues 
by reallocating the intermediate consumption to the appropriate sector in the IO table.  
To make the modeling and analysis tractable, the data have been aggregated into 36 countries 
or regions and 28 sectors, with a focus on LDCs and the products they export. The geographic 
and sectoral composition is shown in Annex Table 1. Unfortunately, since the poorest countries 
have the least-available and lowest-quality data, many of the LDCs that we are interested in 
examining are either missing or have only partial data and can be included only on a weighted 
basis in larger regional aggregates. With those caveats, we tried to select for special analysis a 
range of LDCs from Africa and Asia that produce a range of products, both clothing and 
agricultural products. Similar factors around regional and export diversity drove the decision on 
which other small and vulnerable economies, and which preference-giving countries to isolate 
in the analysis. 
   
                                                           
4 See the description of the database at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/trade_data.asp. 4 
 
The Baseline 
The first issue is to identify where we are now with respect to LDC market access. The 
Millennium Declaration approved by UN members in 2000 called for developed countries to 
provide DFQF market access for LDCs on essentially all products. The ministerial communiqué 
released by the WTO in Hong Kong in 2005 reaffirmed this commitment, but, at the insistence 
of U.S. negotiators, defined “essentially all products” as 97 percent of tariff lines.
5  
Most of Europe has already opened markets for 100 percent of exports from LDCs, as have 
Australia and New Zealand.
6 Japan and Canada provide access for over 98 percent of products 
for LDCs, while the United States provides duty-free access for only around 80 percent of 
products for LDCs outside sub-Saharan Africa and Haiti, and South Korea’s preference program 
for LDCs covers only 75 percent of tariff lines. Among other OECD countries, Turkey provides 
DFQF access for most products outside agriculture and Mexico does not yet have a preference 
program. India and China also adopted preference programs for LDCs in recent years. These 
programs are described in more detail in Elliott (2009). Finally, at the WTO ministers’ meeting in 
Geneva in December 2009, Brazil announced that it would introduce a program in 2010, rather 
than waiting for the conclusion of the Doha Round, as it had earlier insisted.
7 
Since the MAcMapHS6 version 2 database is based on 2004 data, we needed to update the 
database to reflect relevant trade policy changes occurring since then, including: 
-  expanded duty-free access for LDCs in 
o  Japan 
o  South Korea 
o  India 
o  China 
o  Switzerland 
o  Turkey 
-  the phasing out of the implementation period for the protocol products in the EU27 for 
the EBA (rice, sugar, bananas) 
-  implementation of free trade agreements between 
o  the United States and Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) 
o  India and South Asian neighbors (SAFTA) 
o  the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU27 and ACP countries that 
have signed an agreement or at least an interim agreements. 
 
The Scenarios 
In order to explore a range of possible outcomes, we analyzed 10 different scenarios: 
A.  97% of tariff lines liberalized by OECD countries for LDCs 
                                                           
5 See, for example, the analysis in Oxfam International (2005). 
6 We ignore the fact that the EU program excludes armaments as they are commercially insignificant. 
7 See his statement at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/min09_statements_e.htm.  5 
 
B.  97% of tariff lines liberalized by OECD countries for the LDCs and other designated 
countries (defined as those below the World Bank’s low middle-income threshold, per 
capita, and with total national incomes below $50 billion) 
C.  97% of tariff lines liberalized by OECD countries plus Brazil, China, and India for the LDCs 
D.  97% of tariff lines liberalized by the countries in C for the beneficiaries in B 
E.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries to LDCs 
F.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries to LDCs and other designated countries (as defined 
in B) 
G.  100% DFQF given by countries in C to LDCs 
H.  Same as G but DFQF extended to other designated countries (as defined in B) 
I.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries to LDCs and low-income countries with populations 
smaller than 75 million 
J.  Same as I plus larger low-income countries (Vietnam, Pakistan) 
 
All scenarios are implemented in 2010. 
 
In some scenarios, liberalization only concerns 97% of tariff lines and preference-giving 
countries are free to select the products excluded. In this case, we use the political economy 
criterion developed by Jean, Laborde and Martin (2008) to select the tariff lines excluded from 
liberalization. It is based on a political economy approach where the government (common 
agent) gives protection to economic sectors (multi-principals) against financial transfers and 
maximizes a function which includes national welfare and these financial transfers. As a result 
of this model, the government is supposed to select lines which maximize a political economy 
indicator depending positively on the height of the tariff and the magnitude of imports.   
 
With the Mirage model simulations, it is possible to underline some interesting results that 
would be generated by these different scenarios, and in particular the distribution of potential 
gains and losses. In addition to the impact on different groups of preference beneficiaries, we 
are also interested in the impact on developed countries’ production. The remaining tariff 
peaks in developed countries are the result of lobbying by powerful political constituencies, so, 
in order to assess the political feasibility of various scenarios, it is important to analyze the 
impact on preference-giving countries as well. 
  
The Impact of 100 percent Market Access in OECD Countries for LDCs 
Previous studies by Berisha-Krasniqi, Bouët, Laborde and Mevel, among others, demonstrated 
that tariff peaks in rich countries are concentrated in a few tariff lines and, therefore, 97 
percent duty-free access provides very little benefit.
8 That result was confirmed by this analysis, 
which shows no LDC gaining even as much as one-tenth of one percent in additional exports 
from 97 percent product coverage. For similar reasons, including that LDC exports are relatively 
concentrated, 97 percent coverage by more advanced developing countries also results in 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Heckman B, Ng F and Olarreaga M, 2002, Eliminating Excessive Tariffs on exports of Least 
Developed Countries 6 
 
relatively small export gains. For that reason, in the discussion that follows, we focus on the 
scenarios involving 100 percent DFQF market access. The results in terms of overall export 
changes for all but two of the scenarios are presented in Annex Table 2.
9 
In this section, we will focus on the results when OECD countries provide 100 percent DFQF 
market access, and we examine the effects both for those benefiting from DFQF market access 
and others that might suffer preference erosion.
10 Table 1 shows the change in exports and 
overall welfare for one Asian and four African LDCs, as well as two aggregates containing 
LDCs—Rest of Southeast Asia, which includes Cambodia and Laos (as well as oil exporter 
Brunei), and Rest of Africa, which contains a mix of LDCs, as well as other low- and middle-
income countries, making it particularly difficult to interpret.  
 
Table 1: Percentage change in Key Variables in 2020 from OECD implantation of 100% DFQF for LDCs 
(sorted by change in welfare). 
 
DFQF Recipients  Exports  Welfare 
 
Other developing countries  Exports  Welfare 
Malawi  12.97  2.65 
 
Mauritius  0.03  0.02 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  0.95 
 
Central America  0.14  0.01 
Ethiopia  1.35  0.29 
 
South Africa  0.02  0.00 
Bangladesh  4.16  0.29 
 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.39  0.17 
 
Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00 
Senegal  1.16  0.15 
 
Nigeria  0.01  0.00 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.03 
 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.00 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.02 
 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  0.00 
       
China  -0.03  0.00 
       
India  -0.01  0.00 
       
Pakistan  -0.04  0.00 
       
Philippines  -0.01  0.00 
       
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01 
       
Brazil  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.01 
       
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03 
 
 
                                                           
9 Two scenarios, D and H, involve Brazil, China, and India providing DFQF access to countries other than LDCs and, 
since no one has proposed that, they are excluded to save space. 
10 Annex Table 3 shows the results for additional economy-wide variables for all countries and regions in the 
database for the two central scenarios:  where only the OECD provides 100 percent DFQF market access for LDCs, 
and where Brazil, China, and India do so as well. 7 
 
With the exception of extremely small losses for Madagascar, the other LDCs for which we have 
data show gains from 100 percent DFQF access in OECD markets. It is also notable, given the 
concerns about the extension of U.S. preferences to Asian apparel exporters, that the export 
losses in Madagascar in this scenario come in agriculture, not the apparel sector. Additional 
details on the potential implications of these changes for sub-Saharan African LDCs are 
discussed in Box 1 at the end of this section. Moreover, these small losses are reversed if the 
major emerging markets also provide duty-free, quota-free market access (see below).   
Overall, Malawi is the biggest gainer by far because of an unusual set of circumstances—a 
relatively high dependence on tobacco exports facing an unusually high, 350 percent, tariff in 
the U.S. market, which leads to a sharp increase in exports of that product. Thus, this case also 
underscores the need for complementary government policies to guard against increased 
export concentration and commodity dependence when trade barriers are lifted.  
The reported gains for the rest of Africa region are noticeably smaller than for the individual 
African LDCs and this could be due to the fact that only a subset of countries in the aggregation 
are LDCs that receive expanded access.  As expected, an examination of more detailed results 
for Southeast Asia shows that the gains are mostly due to increased exports of apparel to the 
U.S. market, as are the gains for Bangladesh. The sectoral change in exports, by country or 
region, for this scenario is shown in Annex Table 4. The increased export of apparel from 
Southeast Asia probably represents mostly exports from Cambodia, since Laos is small and has 
very little export capacity and Brunei, the third country in that aggregate, exports mostly oil and 
faces low tariffs. 
What is also notable in Table 1 is that other competing countries that might be expected to 
suffer from preference erosion—Mauritius, South Africa, and Central America—instead show 
gains, albeit very small. And for other developing countries, if they suffer losses at all, estimated 
losses fall well below one-tenth of one percent of total exports or national income. 
To put the potential gains in some perspective, we can compare them to two other sets of 
results—general equilibrium estimates of the welfare gains from global free trade, and partial 
equilibrium estimates of the export gains of moving from 97 percent to 100 percent product 
coverage in the context of a feasible Doha Round outcome (based on what was on the table in 
the summer of 2008 when the talks collapsed).   
With respect to the gains from global free trade, Bouët (2008) uses the same MIRAGE model 
and estimates that global free trade would produce welfare gains of around 0.8% of national 
income for low-income countries. In contrast to unilateral trade preferences in OECD markets, 
global free trade would bring additional gains from access to other developing-country markets, 
as well as from these countries’ liberalization of their own markets. Thus, it is notable that the 
estimated benefits from 100 percent market access for LDCs show welfare gains well above the 
level estimated for global free trade for Malawi and Southeast Asia, and of more than a third of 
that level for Bangladesh and Ethiopia.  
While they are the only technique for showing the global distribution of gains and losses from 
changes in trade policy, computable general equilibrium models have features that make the 8 
 
size of the estimates quite conservative.  To suggest the range of possible benefits, Table 2 
contrasts the CGE results for LDCs with estimates from Laborde (2008), which uses a less 
conservative, partial equilibrium, approach that takes into account only potential changes in 
demand in the liberalizing countries, and not potential supply constraints in the exporting 
countries.
 11  In addition to using a different estimation method, the Laborde results are in the 
context of the WTO’s Doha Round and thus only cover the 32 WTO members. 
The partial equilibrium analysis suggests that total LDC exports could increase as much as $2 
billion, or 17 percent. The largest relative gains in both sets of estimates go to Malawi, as well 
as the Asian LDCs that face tariff peaks on their exports of apparel to the U.S. market. Other 
African LDCs see smaller gains, but that is not surprising since they generally have good access 
in their major markets. The partial equilibrium estimates of gross gains are also available for 
other LDCs that are members of the WTO and those show large gains for Benin and Sierra 
Leone, and gains of a quarter or more, relative to base-year exports, for Maldives, Nepal, and 
Niger (Laborde 2008, p. 22).  
 
Table 2: Percentage Variation in Exports for two scenarios in two models  
   100 % OECD DFQF  100 % OECD + MICS
b 
 
General Equilibrium   Partial Equilibium
 a   General Equilibrium   Partial Equilibium 
 
Bangladesh  4.16  28.96  4.82  38.55 
Cambodia 
c  2.52  31.27  2.55  32.96 
    Clothing  19.49  n.a.  19.51  n.a. 
Ethiopia  1.35  n.a.  2.24  n.a. 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.74  0.57  20.61 
Malawi  12.97  215.08  13.91  240.41 
Mozambique  0.39  16.29  1.41  128.11 
Senegal  1.16  8.46  9.38  64.83 
All WTO LDCs
d  n.a.  16.97  n.a.  44.36 
All WTO LDCs
b (million dollars)  2 108     7 731 
n.a. = not available. 
      a. Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United States; the EU is excluded because it provides 100 percent DFQF. 
b. The CGE model includes South Korea and Mexico in OECD, while the partial equilibrium includes them with 
Brazil, China, and India as middle-income countries. 
c. In the CGE model, the results are for the regional aggregate, "rest of South East Asia," which includes Laos and 
Brunei, as well as Cambodia, which dominates exports. 
d. The partial equilibrium estimates are in the context of a Doha Round agreement and thus only include WTO 
LDCs. 
 
                                                           
11 In this model, LDCs have no supply constraints and react perfectly to the increased demand for their products 
when barriers are removed. See Fontagne, Laborde, and Mitaritonna (2008) for details. 9 
 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the general nor the partial equilibrium estimates 
account for rules of origin or other administrative obstacles that can block access, even when 
traditional trade barriers are eliminated.  Thus, the benefits are likely underestimated because 
they assume full access in the EU market, despite restrictive rules of origin in the EBA program 
that are known to inhibit exports. But the benefits of moving to 100 percent DFQF access in 
other markets would also be less than estimated here if programs for LDCs create or retain 
similar obstacles. That underscores the importance of including changes to restrictive rules of 
origin, as recommended by the CGD Working Group on Global Trade Preference Reform.
12 
For example, the EU rule of origin for fish restricts exports from countries that do not have 
domestically-owned commercial fleets capable of operating beyond territorial waters in the 
country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). When fish are caught in a country’s EEZ, the rule of 
origin under the EBA (and other programs) bases eligibility for preferences on the vessel 
owner’s nationality, rather than the exporting country. LDC exports of fishery products can be 
considered eligible if they undergo processing domestically, but that requirement is often 
difficult for LDCs to meet because of onerous sanitary standards.  
Another export that is important for many LDCs is apparel, which under the EBA is subject to a 
“double transformation” rule of origin that requires LDCs to use yarn or fabric that is produced 
domestically and then assembled into a final product. The EU rule is far more restrictive than 
the single transformation rule of origin for apparel under the U.S. African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allows eligible African exporters to source fabric and other 
inputs globally and then assemble them into an apparel item that is eligible for preferences.
13  
   
                                                           
12 Information on the working group, as well as the final report, may be found at 
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/reformingtradepreferences/global_trade_preference_reform.  
13 For more detail, see Portugal-Perez (2007), 10 
 
 
   
Box 1 The Impact on Africa of 100 percent DFQF Market Access in the United States 
Currently, Asian LDCs are outside of the more generous regional preference programs offered by the 
United States and because the GSP program that is available to them excludes apparel, they are 
among the biggest potential gainers from the adoption of 100 percent DFQF access in the U.S. market. 
But the potential increase in competition raises concerns among existing preference beneficiaries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where a handful of countries have been able to take advantage of 
AGOA to increase apparel exports. Unfortunately, our ability to explore these issues in the detail we 
would like is inhibited by lack of data: of the five major African apparel exporters (accounting for 90 
percent of exports under AGOA), we have disaggregated data for only one LDC, Madagascar, as well as 
for Mauritius. Kenya, Lesotho, and Swaziland are included in the Rest of Africa aggregate. 
The results that we have do not suggest that African apparel exporters will systematically lose out. 
More disaggregated results do show modest reductions in African apparel exports to the United 
States, generally in a range of one to one and a half percent of current exports. But if U.S. reform is 
embedded in broader global reform, as modeled here, sub-Saharan African exporters gain access in 
other markets as trade flows adjust globally.  
As noted above, Madagascar is the only significant African LDC apparel exporter for which there is data 
and, while Madagascar is also the only country that does not gain from 100 percent DFQF market 
access in OECD countries, that result is not due to preference erosion in apparel. As shown in annex 
table 4, there is essentially no change in Madagascar’s exports of apparel under this scenario. As also 
shown in that table, Mozambique, which is not currently a major exporter of apparel, would see a 
small gain, as would South Africa, a non-LDC. Mauritius, a major exporter and non-LDC, would see a 
very small loss, while Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal, which export very little apparel, would shift 
resources from that sector to others. It is also important to note, however, that rules of origin are not 
addressed here and changes to those rules in the European Union would be important to allow the 
adjustment to occur in that market in particular. 
Moreover, 100 percent product coverage is of benefit to Africa generally because benefits are 
currently narrowly concentrated in a few countries and products, mainly oil, and full coverage would 
eliminate the exclusions on agricultural exports.
1  To the degree that there are losses from expanding 
preferences for all LDCs, it would be preferable to address these through targeted measures to 
increase competitiveness or to compensate the adjustment, rather than discriminating among LDCs. 11 
 
 
What Happens if the OECD Extends 100 Percent Access to Other Small, Poor Countries?  
We tested three different scenarios for extending eligibility for DFQF market access in OECD 
countries beyond LDCs to: 
a)  Low-income countries with populations smaller than 75 million, the size threshold used 
by the UN in designating LDCs and the criteria for expanded DFQF access in Norway. 
b)  All low-income countries, including Vietnam and Pakistan. 
c)  Additional small and vulnerable countries that fall below the World Bank’s low middle-
income (per capita) threshold with total national incomes below $50 billion, which 
excludes Pakistan and Vietnam because they are large. 
Table 3 shows the estimated change in exports for potential beneficiaries under each scenario, 
as well as those left out.  In general, extending DFQF market access to other low-income 
countries, even when Pakistan and Vietnam are included, entails generally small losses for both 
LDC beneficiaries and excluded countries, and, when they are included, large gains for Pakistan 
and Vietnam. There are relatively large losses for Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Central 
America, but they remain well under one-half of one percent in those cases. Unfortunately, the 
benefits for the smaller low-income countries is harder to assess because of data limitations, 
with only Pakistan and Vietnam having sufficient information available to assess the impact in 
detail. The increase in exports for the rest of Africa region could be due to increased benefits 
for low-income countries in that region. 
Extending DFQF market access to other small and low middle-income countries creates large 
gains for those countries for which we have data, especially Paraguay (17%) and Sri Lanka 
(21%). The African, Central American, and Latin American residual regional aggregates also gain, 
presumably because they include small, low middle-income countries that would gain from 
additional access. But this scenario leads to modest reductions in the gains for Asian LDCs and 
either larger declines in gains or outright losses for African LDCs, including of more than 1 
percent of exports for Ethiopia and Madagascar. The inclusion of low income countries, 
especially from Latin America and Asia, will expand the scope of products on which African LDCs 
will face increased competition, first of all in agriculture. Preference erosion losses also increase 
for other developing countries, though they are relatively small except for Mauritius.  
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(OECD for LDCs 
plus small LICs) 
J 
(OECD for LDCs 
plus all LICs) 
F 
(LDCs plus other 
small, poor) 
LDCs:             
Bangladesh  4.16  4.07  3.38  3.46 
Ethiopia  1.35  1.10  0.90  -0.49 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.36  -0.70  -2.28 
Malawi  12.97  11.42  11.15  4.71 
Mozambique  0.39  0.27  0.21  -0.48 
Senegal  1.16  1.17  1.12  0.80 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.52  2.25  2.40 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.23  0.29  0.49 
  
     
  
Preference recipients in 
Scenario J :             
Pakistan  -0.04  -0.06  11.90  -0.05 
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.02  18.00  -0.06 
  
     
  
Preference recipients in 
Scenario F:             
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  3.46 
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  16.95 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  -0.05  -0.27  20.94 
  
     
  
Other developing 
countries:             
Brazil  -0.03  -0.03  -0.07  -0.12 
China  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10  -0.06 
India  -0.01  -0.01  0.04  -0.04 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.03  0.02  -0.07 
Mauritius  0.03  -0.24  -0.35  -1.96 
Nigeria  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03 
Philippines  -0.01  -0.02  -0.17  -0.07 
South Africa  0.02  0.02  0.04  -0.02 
Central America  0.14  0.13  -0.02  0.83 
Middle East, North Africa  0.01  0.00  0.00  3.51 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.12 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.06  -0.07  0.78 
LICs = low-income countries (World Bank definition); other small and poor are those classified 
as low middle-income by the World Bank, with total national incomes of less than $50 billion. 13 
 
How Important is Improved Access in Large, Emerging Markets? 
For some countries, particularly in Africa, extension of full market access by large emerging 
markets would significantly expand the potential gains from unilateral preference programs. In 
these scenarios, we include as emerging markets China and India, which have implemented 
partial duty-free preferences for LDCs, and Brazil, which also recently announced that it will 
introduce a program next year.
14 China announced a few years ago that it would provide duty-
free, quota-free access on 440 tariff lines for 30 sub-Saharan African with which it has 
diplomatic relations and then announced an expansion of that in late 2009 to 95 percent of 
tariff lines. It also offers DFQF on a smaller number of tariff lines to Asian LDCs with whom it 
has relations. India’s programs provide DFQF market access on 85 percent of tariff lines and 
partial duty reductions on another 9 percent, phased in over several years. The announcement 
by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in Geneva last year said that Brazil would begin providing 
duty-free access for LDCs on 80 percent of items in 2010 and then increase coverage to “all 
tariff lines” over four years.
15 
Unfortunately, we do not have full information on these programs and we have to make some 
assumptions to identify the products likely to be excluded in the 97 percent coverage scenario, 
which could skew the results somewhat. From what we do know about these programs, the 
political economy and the range of import-sensitive products appear to be similar to what we 
find in OECD countries. Thus, China’s original list of covered products excluded cotton, sugar, 
most fruits and vegetables, and a number of textile and apparel products (we do not have the 
expanded list). India includes sugar and cotton, but excludes a number of other agricultural 
products and offers no or only partial preferences on many textile and apparel products. 
Textiles and apparel were also raised as sensitive by industry groups in Brazil.
16  
 Thus, we have had to decide which products to exclude in the 97 percent product coverage 
scenario with limited information. The partial list of exclusions that we have suggests that the 
political economy of preferences is similar in these countries to that in the OECD, and if we use 
a similar method for selecting sensitive products, then the exclusions turn out to be nearly as 
important in these emerging market programs as in OECD countries.
17 This is somewhat 
surprising, since overall trade barriers are higher on average in developing countries, but it is 
consistent with what we observe about the high concentration in a few sectors of LDC exports. 
Thus, the analysis suggests that meaningful impact on LDC exports and welfare (Table 4 and 
Annex Table 3) will result only if emerging markets also provide 100 percent product coverage. 
                                                           
14 Turkey is included as a member of the OECD in those simulations. 
15 Because Minister Amorim’s statement also refers to the Hong Kong communiqué, it is not entirely clear whether 
the commitment is to eventually cover 100 percent or 97 percent of tariff lines. See his statement on the WTO 
website at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/min09_statements_e.htm.  
16 On China, see Minson (2007); for a comparison of China and India, drawing on the political economy literature, 
see Engel (processed); and on Brazil, see Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 10, Number 41, December 
6,2006. 
17 As discussed in the methodology section, we determine exclusion list based on Jean, Laborde and Martin (2008) 
political economy criterion. 14 
 
Table 4: Comparing the Percentage Change in Export Volume in 2020 when Brazil, China, and India 
also grant 100% DFQF to LDCs 
LDCs  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
 
EMs  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
Malawi  12.97  13.91 
 
Brazil  -0.03  0.00 
Senegal  1.16  9.38 
 
China  -0.03  -0.02 
Bangladesh  4.16  4.82 
 
India  -0.01  0.64 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.55 
        Ethiopia  1.35  2.24 
        Mozambique  0.39  1.41 
        Madagascar  -0.03  0.57 
        Rest of Africa  0.08  0.22 
       
              Other developing countries  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
        Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04 
        Central America  0.14  0.14 
        Indonesia  -0.03  -0.03 
        Mauritius  0.03  0.05 
        Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00 
        Nigeria  0.01  -0.13 
        Pakistan  -0.04  -0.06 
        Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03 
        Philippines  -0.01  -0.02 
        Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.01 
        Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.01 
        Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.04 
        South Africa  0.02  0.03 
        Sri Lanka  -0.01  -0.05 
        Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01 
         
Focusing on the 100 percent product coverage scenario where emerging markets join OECD 
countries, this is the only scenario examined where Madagascar shifts from small losses to 
small gains. This scenario also results in more marked increased gains for several other LDCs in 
Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal, with more modest additional benefits 
for the Asian LDCs. The African regional aggregate also sees a large relative gain, though it 
remains small in absolute terms. 
The partial equilibrium estimates in Table 2 show a similar distribution of gains, but of a much 
larger magnitude. In this scenario, exports from Madagascar, Mozambique, and Senegal could 
increase by as much as 21 percent, 128 percent, 65 percent, respectively, compared to 
increases of 10 percent or less in the general equilibrium modeling. Overall, the partial 
equilibrium estimates for all WTO LDCs suggest an average increase in exports of up to 44 
percent, worth an additional $8 billion for these countries. 15 
 
Perhaps the most interesting result in the general equilibrium analysis is that all three emerging 
markets granting 100 percent DFQF market access improve their position relative to the 
scenario where only the OECD grants DFQF market access to LDCs. Other developing countries 
see little or no preference erosion as a result of the expanded access for LDCs (Table 4). 
What is the Impact of 100 percent DFQF Market Access for OECD Countries? 
The overall conclusion regarding the impact on preference-giving countries—both developed 
and developing—is that it is small. Annex Table 3 shows the results from the CGE model for 
changes in exports, GDP, and welfare, among other indicators, and they are indistinguishable 
from zero for all preference-giving countries when 100 percent DFQF for LDCs is given, either by 
the OECD only, or OECD plus Brazil, China, and India. Table 5 shows the sector-specific variation 
in production for preference-giving countries and, while the impact often exceeds the average, 
economy-wide impact (not surprisingly), there is only a handful of cases where production 
declines rise to even as much as 0.5 percent.   
For the OECD countries not already granting 100 percent product coverage, the most sensitive 
products are often agricultural products subject to tariff-rate quotas to help control supply and 
prop up prices. The expressed concern, whether in Japan for rice and dairy, Canada for dairy 
and poultry, or sugar in the United States, is that expanded market access for LDCs will 
destabilize the price support programs. It is true, that the estimated reductions for agricultural 
products that are commonly controlled through quantitative restrictions could be suppressed 
because the model cannot completely address the prospects for trade creation in cases where 
little or no trade currently exists. Still, one would not expect large gains for potential LDC 
exporters of commodities such as meat and dairy products because it would be difficult for 
poor countries to meet rich-country food safety standards for these products.  And in other 
sectors, the prospects for significant supply expansion are limited.
  
To explore one example in more detail, are the CGE results in Table 5 and Annex Table 4 that 
show very little change in either exports or U.S. production of sugar from providing 100 percent 
DFQF for LDCs plausible? While the estimate of no change in production is influenced by the 
restrictions imposed on trade creation in cases of zero trade, a brief survey of LDC exporters 
and markets also suggests there is little reason to expect a large surge in U.S. imports if sugar is 
included in DFQF for LDCs. Currently, only two African LDCs—Malawi and Mozambique—have 
access to the U.S. market under the historical quota allocation system and their quotas are 
small. Only two other African LDCs—Ethiopia and Zambia—have had exportable sugar surpluses 
in recent years. But African sugar producers tend to be relatively high-cost and transportation 
costs are also high.
18 The European Union is also the traditional market for African exporters, 
though some of those exports could shift to the American market since the reform of the EU 
sugar regime (forced by a WTO complaint by Brazil) reduced the internal price from 50 percent 
higher to roughly the same level as in the United States.  
   
                                                           
18 The exception to this is Sudan, which is planning large investments in sugar production with the aim of boosting 
output ten-fold. But Sudan is currently excluded from U.S. preference programs and the U.S. market by 
comprehensive foreign policy sanctions over human rights and democracy issues. Table 5: Percentage Change in Production Volume from implementing 100% DFQF for LDCs* 
Sector  ANZ  Canada  EFTA  EU  Japan  S. Korea  Mexico  Turkey  US  Brazil  China  India 
Agrofood  -0.04   -0.06   -0.02   -0.00   -0.02   2.02   -0.00   -0.04   -0.05   -0.05   -0.01   -0.09  
Industry  0.01   0.01   0.00   -0.00   0.00   -0.11   0.01   0.02   0.01   0.02   -0.00   0.15  
Animal and meat products  -0.05   -0.01   -0.00   -0.01   -0.01   1.24   -0.01   -0.37   0.02   0.08   0.00   0.13  
Beverage and tobacco  -0.00   -0.00   0.01   -0.00   -0.00   0.11   0.01   0.04   0.02   -0.01   -0.00   0.01  
Chemical rubber plastic  0.01   -0.01   0.00   -0.01   -0.02   0.14   0.01   0.01   0.01   -0.01   -0.00   0.14  
Coal oil gas  -0.02   0.02   -0.00   -0.00   0.02   -0.47   0.03   0.01   0.03   0.01   0.05   -0.37  
Cotton wool silk forestry  0.02   0.02   0.05   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.07   0.03   0.03   0.02   -0.09  
Fish  -0.01   -0.01   0.00   0.00   -0.01   0.30   0.00   -0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.01   -0.10  
Leather products  0.02   -0.01   0.02   0.00   0.02   0.18   0.01   0.09   0.05   -0.08   -0.01   0.47  
Metals  0.06   0.04   0.01   -0.00   0.01   -0.29   0.01   0.02   0.04   0.06   0.02   0.30  
Milk  -0.05   -0.03   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   0.98   0.01   0.02   -0.10   -0.00   0.01   -0.00  
Oil seeds  -0.97   -0.57   0.48   -0.17   -0.38   -57.62   -0.45   -1.56   -0.99   -0.41   -0.33   -0.07  
Other cereal grains  0.04   -0.06   -0.01   -0.00   -0.01   0.84   0.01   -0.12   0.04   0.17   0.01   0.05  
Other crops  0.02   -0.40   0.14   0.03   -0.03   0.07   -0.14   -0.66   -0.76   -0.05   -0.03   -0.14  
Other food products  -0.05   -0.03   -0.00   -0.00   -0.03   1.99   0.01   0.02   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   0.08  
Other manufactured products  0.02   0.02   0.00   -0.00   0.01   -0.15   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.03   0.01   0.16  
Other minerals  0.01   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.24   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.06  
Other services  -0.00   0.00   -0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.03   0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.04  
Rice  0.03   0.09   0.29   0.13   -0.00   -0.01   -0.00   -0.32   0.04   0.00   0.00   0.10  
Services  -0.00   0.00   -0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.02   0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.04  
Sugar  -0.15   0.01   -0.54   0.21   -0.35   4.43   0.01   0.06   0.01   0.15   -0.17   0.03  
Textile  -0.27   -0.57   0.05   0.07   -0.03   -0.23   -0.22   0.08   -0.45   -0.09   -0.11   0.21  
Trade  -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   0.00   -0.00   0.12   0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   0.00   -0.06  
Transport  0.01   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.07   0.01   -0.00   0.01   0.01   0.00   -0.00  
Vegetable and fruit  0.04   0.05   -0.00   0.00   0.01   0.84   0.00   0.06   0.03   0.01   0.00   -0.62  
Vegetable oils and fats  -0.51   -0.91   -1.36   -0.24   -0.27   120.93   -0.07   0.03   0.02   -0.50   -0.46   -0.20  
Wearing apparel  -0.10   -0.01   0.02   0.03   -0.00   -0.11   -0.03   0.03   -0.13   -0.06   -0.21   0.41  
Wheat  0.10   0.05   0.01   0.00   0.01   0.36   0.02   -0.02   0.04   0.09   0.01   0.06  
*For OECD countries, when only they implement; for emerging markets, when they implement along with OECD.  
To explore further the potential for market disruption from increased African sugar exports, we 
applied a simple partial equilibrium analysis to this sector. Table 6 shows the impact on 
domestic production and prices from two scenarios, one where U.S. imports of sugar increase 
by 100,000 short tons, which would have almost no impact on U.S. prices and production, and a 
second with increased imports of 300,000 short tons, which would reduce production by 6 
percent and average prices by 10 percent, to 20 cents per pound.
19 Though there is no 
economic justification for the U.S. price-support program for sugar, these estimates suggest 
that at least some expansion of access is possible, without major disruption of the market, as 
long as that remains the political goal of the minority that controls policy. 
Another sensitive sector for the United States is apparel and, here, both the CGE and partial 
equilibrium (Table 2 and Annex Table 4) results do show relatively large increases in apparel 
exports by Bangladesh and Southeast Asia (mostly by Cambodia). But, again, the impact on U.S. 
production is small, -0.45 percent for textiles and -0.13 for clothing. If removal of tariffs led to 
increased imports that are two to three times higher than estimated in the CGE model, closer 
to what is suggested by the partial equilibrium model (Table 1), and if the impact on production 
is proportional, it would still be in a range of one to two percent.
20 
There are two major reasons for the relatively limited impact on U.S. production. First, the 
increase in imports from the Asian LDCs is offset to some extent by small decreases in exports 
spread among a large number of other exporters. Secondly, LDCs tend not to compete in the 
same product lines as American producers, who are generally far more technology 
sophisticated and capital-intensive. This is illustrated by the fact that Bangladesh’s apparel 
exports are equal to 12.4 percent of the volume of U.S. production, but only 2.75% of the value. 
   
                                                           
19 The estimates were done using the partial equilibrium model in Hufbauer and Elliott (1994). 
20 The estimated 4 percent increase in Bangladeshi exports from the CGE model, shown in Table 1, for all exports 
to all countries. As shown in Annex Table 4, the increase in exports of textiles and clothing, most of which would be 
to the United States, is nearly 13 percent. The partial equilibrium estimates of increased exports are a bit more 
than twice that figure for Bangladesh and roughly 50 percent higher for Cambodia. 18 
 
Table 6: Effects of enlarging the U.S. Sugar Quota 
Estimated levels after altering quota  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  
 
     
New Import Price (calculated, dollars/short ton)                         414.3                          376.1  
New Import Volume (assumed, '000 short tons)                     1,500.0                      1,700.0  
New Domestic Price (calculated, dollars/short ton)                         421.6                          395.0  
New Domestic Output (calculated, '000 short tons)                     8,318.9                      8,000.1  
  
 
     




  Import Price (dollars/short ton) 
 
                       437.0  
  Import Volume (WTO quota level, '000 short tons)                     1,400.0  
  Domestic Price (dollars/short ton) 
 
                       437.0  
  Domestic Output ('000 short tons) 
 
                   8,500.0  
    
 
  
  Elasticities and intercepts used for calculations (see 
Hufbauer and Elliott) 
  
    
    
 
  
   (i) Domestic Demand 
 
  
     Own-Price Elasticity (Edd) 
 
  
     Cross-Price Elasticity (Edm) 
 
-1.33  
    
 
1.30  
   (ii) Domestic Supply 
 
  
     Own-Price Elasticity (Es) 
 
  
    
 
0.60  
   (iii) Import Demand 
 
  
     Own-Price Elasticity (Emm) 
 
  
     Cross-Price Elasticity (Emd) 
 
-3.78  
    
 
3.69  
   (iv) Equation Intercepts 
 
  
    ln(a) 
 
  
    ln(b) 
 
9.23  
    ln(c) 
 
5.40  
        7.79  
  Source for model and parameters: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliott,  
Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States, Washington: Institute for  
International Economics, 1994, p. 81 
 
Source for data: U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Sugar and Sweeteners:  
Recommended Data, online at http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/sugar/data.htm. 
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Conclusions 
Unilateral trade preference programs were created four decades ago to stimulate exports and 
help developing countries diversify their economies as part of their development strategies. 
Through preferences, but also regional and multilateral negotiations, many developing 
countries succeeded spectacularly in using trade as a tool of development, but the least 
developed countries lagged for a variety of reasons. The duty-free, quota-free market access 
initiative was developed to give these countries a boost.  
While significant progress has been made toward the goal of improved market access for LDCs 
since the Millennium Declaration embraced it in 2000, much also remains to be done. This 
analysis helps to identify the distribution of potential costs and benefits from further progress. 
Several key conclusions stand out: 
-  There are still significant benefits for LDCs from removing the remaining barriers they 
face in OECD countries, but only if all products are covered.  Since both rich-country 
tariff peaks and LDC exports are relatively concentrated, excluding as few as three 
percent of tariff lines, as proposed by the United States at the WTO ministerial meeting 
in Hong Kong in 2005, reduces the benefits to basically zero. 
-  Although it has nearly full access in its main markets, including in the United States 
under AGOA, sub-Saharan Africa can still gain from 100 percent DFQF market access 
that eliminates remaining agricultural restrictions in the U.S. markets.  
-  The gains for LDCs, especially in Africa, are significantly enhanced if Brazil, China, and 
India also provide 100 percent DFQF market access. 
-  There is little evidence of significant losses for other competing developing countries 
that are not LDCs, including Pakistan or Sri Lanka, nor is there evidence of net losses for 
Africa from the United States extending DFQF market access to Asian LDCs.  
-  The LDCs account for a trivial share of global exports, the reason for the initiative, and 
preference-giving countries thus have little to fear from extending full market access to 
them. The quantitative results show that the expected impact on welfare, exports, and 
domestic production are very small to zero, including for the quota-controlled 
agricultural products excluded by Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as 
textiles and apparel in the latter case. 
-  Relative to the scenario where only the OECD does so, the large emerging markets do 
better if they also grant 100 percent DFQF market access to LDCs. 20 
 
-  Extending DFQF access to other low-income countries (by the World Bank definition) 
has little impact on existing LDC beneficiaries or preference-giving countries, but big 
benefits for Pakistan and Vietnam if they are included.
21 
-  Extending DFQF to other small and poor (lower middle-income) countries has large 
benefits in some cases for those countries, but at the expense of existing LDC 
beneficiaries, especially in Africa, and also entails higher costs for preference-giving 
countries. 
The context around these potential gains is also important, however. In particular, they assume 
full utilization of available market access, but that does not happen for a number of reasons. It 
is not happening under the EU’s Everything But Arms program because of rules of origin that 
are highly restrictive in some sectors and prevent LDC exporters being able to take advantage. 
The value of U.S. and other reforms in the future will also depend on what kind of rules they 
choose to implement. Policies outside preference programs themselves, such sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary standards affecting agricultural trade in importing countries, and inadequate 
infrastructure and excessive red tape in LDCs, are often at least as important as traditional 
border measures and will also have to be addressed. 
But providing market access is a step that this analysis suggests would be both beneficial for 
LDCs, and low-cost for preference-giving countries. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon just 
designated 2010 as the “year of development” and called for accelerated efforts to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. The goal of providing duty-free, quota-free market access for 
LDCs should be easily achievable by rich countries, as well as by Brazil, China, India, and other 
developing countries “in a position to do so.”  
 
   
                                                           
21 Note, however, that Pakistan recently moved into the World Bank’s low-middle income category and Vietnam is 
expected to do so, possibly as soon as this year. 21 
 
Annex Table 1: Regions and Sectors Used in the Model 
Regions  Sectors 
Australia New Zealand  Agrofood (aggregate) 
Bangladesh*  Animal and meat products 
Bolivia**  Beverage and tobacco products 
Brazil  Chemical rubber plastic products 
Canada  Coal oil gas 
Central America***  Cotton wool silk forestry 
China  Fish 
EFTA  Industry (aggregate) 
Ethiopia*  Leather products 
EU  Metals 
India  Milk 
Indonesia  Oil seeds 
Japan  Other cereal grains 
Korea South  Other crops (includes raw tobacco) 
Madagascar*  Other food products 
Malawi*  Other manufactured products 
Mauritius  Other minerals 
Mexico  Other services 
Middle East and North Africa  Rice 
Mozambique*  Services 
Nigeria  Sugar 
Oil exporting countries  Textile 
Pakistan  Trade 
Paraguay**  Transport 
Philippines  Vegetable and fruit 
Rest of Africa***  Vegetable oils and fats 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  Wearing apparel 
Rest of Eastern Europe  Wheat 
Rest of Latin America***    
Rest of South East Asia*    
Senegal*    
South Africa    
Sri Lanka**    
Turkey    
US    
Vietnam    
* Least developed countries 
** Other small and poor countries 
*** Region includes LDCs and/or other small and poor countries 
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Annex Table 2: Percentage Change in Total Export Value  in 2020 in Selected DFQF Scenarios  
(see text for scenario definitions) 
Region  A  B  C  E  F  G  I  J 
ANZ  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.04 
Bangladesh  0.06  0.08  0.15  4.16  3.46  4.82  4.07  3.38 
Bolivia  0.00  0.08  0.00  -0.03  3.46  -0.04  -0.04  -0.02 
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.12  0.00  -0.03  -0.07 
Canada  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
C Am  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.14  0.83  0.14  0.13  -0.02 
China  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.03  -0.10 
EFTA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.01  0.08 
Ethiopia  0.02  0.03  0.22  1.35  -0.49  2.24  1.10  0.90 
EU  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.32  -0.01  0.01  0.12 
India  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.01  -0.04  0.64  -0.01  0.04 
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.07  -0.03  -0.03  0.02 
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.49 
Korea South  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.09  -0.07  -0.09  -0.08  0.41 
Madagascar  0.01  0.00  0.07  -0.03  -2.28  0.57  -0.36  -0.70 
Malawi  0.01  0.01  0.02  12.97  4.71  13.91  11.42  11.15 
Mauritius  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.03  -1.96  0.05  -0.24  -0.35 
Mexico  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
MENA  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01  3.51  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.39  -0.48  1.41  0.27  0.21 
Nigeria  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  -0.13  0.01  0.03 
Oil Xers  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.03 
Pakistan  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  11.90 
Paraguay  0.00  0.06  0.00  -0.04  16.95  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03 
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.02  -0.17 
Rest of 
Africa  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.08  0.49  0.22  0.23  0.29 
Rest of AO  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08 
Rest of EE  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.01  0.10  0.10 
Rest of LA  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.05  0.78  -0.04  -0.06  -0.07 
Rest of SEA  0.05  0.11  0.06  2.52  2.40  2.55  2.52  2.25 
Senegal  0.00  0.01  0.27  1.16  0.80  9.38  1.17  1.12 
South Africa  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.02  0.03  0.02  0.04 
Sri Lanka  0.00  2.10  -0.01  -0.01  20.94  -0.05  -0.05  -0.27 
Turkey  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.92  0.04  0.21  0.30 
US  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Vietnam  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.06  -0.01  -0.02  18.00 
 
   Annex Table 3: Percentage Change in Economy-Wide Variables in 2020 from Implementing 100 percent DFQF for LDCs 
 
Value of exports  GDP (volume)  Real effective XR  Terms of trade  Welfare 
Region  OECD only  With EMs  OECD only  With EMs  OECD only  With EMs  OECD only  With EMs  OECD only  With EMs 
Australia New Zealand  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Bangladesh  4.16  4.82  0.17  0.24  0.97  1.15  0.86  1.02  0.29  0.37 
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Brazil  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Canada  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Central America  0.14  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01 
China  -0.03  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
EFTA  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ethiopia  1.35  2.24  0.21  0.31  0.52  0.78  0.52  0.81  0.29  0.43 
EU  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
India  -0.01  0.64  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.17  -0.01  -0.14  0.00  -0.03 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Korea South  -0.09  -0.09  0.04  0.04  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.11 
Madagascar  -0.03  0.57  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.26  -0.02  0.22  -0.02  0.14 
Malawi  12.97  13.91  1.21  1.40  3.80  4.26  3.98  4.44  2.65  2.99 
Mauritius  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Mexico  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North 
Africa  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.39  1.41  0.15  0.41  0.17  0.67  0.17  0.61  0.17  0.52 
Nigeria  0.01  -0.13  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.08  0.00  -0.11 
Oil exporting countries  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pakistan  -0.04  -0.06  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01 
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
Philippines  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.22  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.11  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.08 
Rest of Asia and  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02 24 
 
Oceania 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.55  0.42  0.43  0.77  0.79  0.52  0.53  0.95  0.97 
Senegal  1.16  9.38  0.15  0.92  0.31  2.52  0.26  2.35  0.15  1.13 
South Africa  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  -0.05  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
Turkey  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
US  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00 
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
XR = exchange rate; Ems = emerging markets (Brazil, China, India) 
Annex Table 4: Percentage Change in Export Volume  in 2020 When OECD Provides 100% DFQF 
 
LDCs 
Sector  Bangla  Ethiopia  Madag  Malawi  Mozamb  RoSEA  Senegal 
Agrofood  1.99  5.79  0.03  14.16  4.12  -3.54  6.47 
Industry  5.01  -3.11  -0.06  -8.46  -0.64  3.33  -1.05 
Animal and meat products  -5.58  -3.03  0.16  -28.10  -4.03  -6.20  -4.24 
Beverage and tobacco  -2.01  3.90  0.04  -4.55  -0.32  -1.88  -0.32 
Chemical rubber plastic 
products  -3.95  -1.56  0.02  -11.33  4.95  -4.37  -1.27 
Coal oil gas  -5.80  -0.01  -0.02  -5.38  -0.45  -2.05  -0.18 
Cotton wool silk forestry  -4.34  -0.55  0.11  -24.93  -3.35  -2.42  -1.75 
Fish  -1.92  -0.44  0.00  -7.67  -0.32  2.02  -0.71 
Leather products  -2.47  -4.68  0.26  -19.35  -0.88  -3.98  -0.13 
Metals  -6.64  -3.17  0.06  -14.70  -0.71  -6.34  -1.48 
Milk  812.46  3583.82  -0.13  -18.47  8.40  -5.25  -1.60 
Oil seeds  24.09  12.92  -0.31  -18.77  14.92  -2.66  -1.49 
Other cereal grains  -1.27  2.13  0.08  -15.51  3.17  -2.09  -2.24 
Other crops  33.98  -2.63  -1.09  63.41  31.55  -3.64  -2.06 
Other food products  -2.34  11.55  0.09  -10.05  -0.16  -3.56  -0.64 
Other manufactured products  -5.17  -2.72  0.04  -13.60  -0.37  -3.50  -0.76 
Other minerals  -1.26  -0.75  0.01  -4.59  -0.10  -1.02  -0.30 
Other services  -3.60  -1.78  0.04  -12.38  -0.48  -3.62  -1.06 
Rice  50.16  -1.24  0.47  -15.12  -1.19  -4.54  -0.56 
Services  -3.64  -1.65  0.03  -10.18  -0.44  -3.44  -0.98 
Sugar  -3.16  0.20  0.67  -11.63  -1.13  -3.83  -2.43 
Textile  5.52  0.82  -0.32  -21.07  -1.81  16.13  -1.50 
Trade  -4.16  -1.77  0.01  -12.04  -0.31  -4.08  -0.93 
Transport  -4.17  -1.45  0.02  -8.76  -0.34  -3.04  -0.80 
Vegetable and fruit  71.00  -1.48  0.17  -18.87  -1.22  -2.84  -1.57 
Vegetable oils and fats  -2.47  -11.43  -0.60  -18.91  1.06  -5.34  102.21 
Wearing apparel  8.17  -2.53  0.04  -18.11  0.65  19.49  -1.64 
Wheat  -3.39  -4.23  0.00  -21.46  0.00  -1.37  0.00 
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Other Developing Countries 
























Lanka  Vietnam 
Agrofood  -0.12  -0.26  -0.23  0.16  0.12  -0.09  -0.09  -0.55  1.18  -0.18  0.00  -0.23  0.08  -0.01  -0.07 
Industry  0.03  0.32  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.06  0.06  0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.01  -0.01  0.00 
Animal, meat 
products  0.04  -0.19  0.02  -0.54  -0.04  0.16  0.25  0.11  0.83  0.27  -0.14  0.14  0.11  0.04  -0.07 
Beverages, tobacco  0.02  -0.09  0.51  -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.17 
Chemical, rubber, 
plastic products  0.05  -0.22  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.09  -0.09  0.00  -0.01  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.20 
Coal, oil, gas  0.06  -0.01  -0.19  -0.03  0.00  -0.05  0.12  -0.12  0.04  -0.09  -0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.00 
Cotton, wool, silk, 
forestry  -0.01  0.03  0.12  -0.20  0.50  0.60  0.08  0.09  -0.52  -0.03  0.35  0.25  0.09  0.08  -0.05 
Fish  0.05  -0.09  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.10  -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  -0.03  0.03  0.08 
Leather products  0.11  -0.30  0.03  -0.04  0.03  0.05  0.10  0.01  -0.25  0.13  0.01  0.14  -0.03  0.03  -0.01 
Metals  0.11  -0.35  0.04  -0.03  0.02  -0.03  0.07  -0.01  -0.13  -0.01  0.01  0.11  -0.07  0.04  0.10 
Milk  -0.04  -0.21  0.14  0.10  0.29  -0.10  -0.02  -0.02  0.19  0.12  -0.04  0.02  0.23  -0.04  0.22 
Oil seeds  -1.78  -1.31  -0.72  -0.33  0.99  -18.84  -0.15  -3.09  96.04  -0.68  -0.78  -0.01  1.81  -0.77  -2.87 
Other cereal grains  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.28  0.03  0.10  0.06  0.13  -0.15  0.56  0.08  0.14  0.28  0.04  0.26 
Other crops  -0.21  -1.12  -0.52  -0.41  -0.01  -0.12  -0.20  -0.40  -0.26  -0.16  -0.32  -1.11  0.03  0.05  -0.17 
Other food products  0.06  -0.15  -0.02  -0.06  0.00  -0.08  -0.01  -0.05  -0.10  0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.05  -0.05  -0.15 
Other mfd. products  0.04  -0.22  0.06  -0.05  -0.01  0.04  0.05  0.02  -0.07  -0.01  0.00  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.00 
Other minerals  -0.01  -0.07  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.01 
Other services  0.07  -0.18  0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.03  -0.09  0.00  0.00  0.08  -0.03  0.02  0.01 
Rice  0.01  0.05  0.17  -0.27  0.14  0.12  0.03  0.17  0.37  0.06  0.06  0.12  0.19  0.10  0.13 
Services  0.07  -0.17  0.04  -0.02  0.00  0.03  0.06  0.03  -0.08  0.00  0.00  0.08  -0.03  0.02  0.01 
Sugar  -0.07  -0.23  -0.28  0.27  0.32  0.23  0.27  -0.43  0.31  0.15  0.09  0.30  -0.13  0.37  -0.17 
Textile  -0.40  4.29  0.04  0.05  0.08  -0.12  0.01  -0.20  -0.25  0.33  0.02  -0.21  -0.07  -0.16  -0.08 
Trade  0.06  -0.20  0.04  -0.03  -0.01  0.03  0.05  0.03  -0.09  -0.01  -0.01  0.07  -0.05  0.01  -0.01 
Transport  0.07  -0.14  0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.02  -0.07  0.00  0.00  0.07  -0.03  0.02  0.00 27 
 
Vegetable, fruit  0.07  -0.03  0.17  -0.20  0.07  0.25  0.08  0.26  -0.45  0.02  0.00  0.08  0.07  0.13  0.09 
Vegetable oils, fats  -0.02  -0.64  -0.43  2.18  -0.15  -0.46  -0.24  -3.75  -2.05  -0.99  -0.77  -1.13  0.48  -0.14  0.43 
Wearing apparel  -0.13  0.60  -0.02  -0.07  0.21  0.01  0.06  -0.08  -0.24  1.04  0.06  -0.01  0.06  -0.03  -0.13 
Wheat  0.00  0.04  0.17  0.00  0.23  0.99  0.08  0.28  -0.51  0.05  0.06  0.15  0.23  0.07  0.07 
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